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I. Introduction 
 In empirical work, selection bias is consistently one of the greatest challenges 
to researchers. It undermines the inferences we make in several ways: it makes  
treatments endogenous, it affects who we observe in a sample and who we do not, 
and it even affects the research we choose to undertake. Clinical trials have long 
dealt with the first consequence of selection bias by using trials in which 
treatments are allocated at random. But there has been little progress in dealing 
with other types of selection. In this paper we explore the consequences of two 
types of selection in clinical trials: of subjects into trials on the basis of private 
information, and of researchers into trials on the basis of information unobserved 
by the profession at large.  
 These selection problems have important consequences for some deeply-held 
attitudes about which trials are ethical to conduct, and the manner in which they 
should be conducted. In particular, selection by subjects generates ex ante 
therapeutic misconception and ex post disappointment about the personal benefit 
from participating in trials, and it provides a rationale for making payments to 
subjects that are likely to be much larger than has been the norm. Selection of 
researchers undermines the rationale for collective equipoise coexisting with trials 
that are designed to maximize statistical power. If collective equipoise is to be 
maintained as an ethical basis for deciding which trials can be conducted, then it 
is unethical to maximize statistical power; if maximizing statistical power is to be 
maintained as the basic criterion for experimental design, then collective 
equipoise is unethical.  
 Although selection by subjects and by researchers are clearly closely related 
issues, it is useful to explore their implications separately. In the introduction, we 
begin the paper as we mean to go on. In Section A we discuss further the 
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problem of selection by subjects, the therapeutic misconception, and 
disappointment. In Section B we discuss selection by researchers and the 
collective equipoise problem. 
A. Self-Selection by Subjects, the Therapeutic Misconception, and Disappointment 
 It is widely understood among members of the profession that the ethics and 
practice of clinical research and ordinary clinical care are fundamentally different. 
When subjects do not understand this, it is known as the therapeutic 
misconception (Appelbaum, Roth and Lidz [1982]). Therapeutic misconceptions 
arise when subjects transfer their expectation that physicians will act in the 
patient’s best interest from a clinical setting to a research setting (Appelbaum 
[2002]); because they do not understand the concept of randomization (Kerr et al. 
[2004]); because they do not understand the constraints imposed on treatments 
offered during trials (Dresser [2002]); or because they have an overwhelming 
psychological need to believe that participation will yield personal benefits 
(Appelbaum et al. [1982]). The combined effect of these disparate influences is 
that subjects’ subjective expectations of the personal benefit of participation 
exceeds the mathematical expectations.  
 The therapeutic misconception conflicts directly with the principle of respect 
for persons as expressed in the requirement of informed consent from voluntary 
participants. Nonetheless, as Dresser [2002] has noted, researchers have in 
practice tolerated therapeutic misconceptions as an inevitable consequence of 
conducting trials. Some have gone so far as to promote them (e.g. Truog et al. 
[1999]). However, a number of proposals have been offered to attenuate the 
therapeutic misconception, including the use of a “neutral discloser” (Appelbaum 
et al. [1982]), changes to consent forms (Appelbaum [1996], Moreno et al. [1998]), 
changes in advertising (Miller and Shorr [1999]), changes in the way physicians 
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recruit subjects (Kass et al. [1996]), and requiring physicians to disclose to their 
patients payments they are receiving for recruiting subjects (Berg [1997]).  
 In many practical settings, these proposed solutions can only make limited 
progress. When the efficacy of an experimental treatment varies among 
individuals, self-selection into trials by individuals who are at least partially-
informed ensures that subjects correctly expect to reap a personal benefit. 
However, under two reasonable scenarios, subjects that do not suffer therapeutic 
misconception in the original sense proposed by Appelbaum et al. [1982] will 
continue to expect, or give the appearance of expecting, personal benefits that 
exceed the true expectation.  
 For both scenarios we consider a setting in which researchers and potential 
subjects have prior beliefs about the individual benefit that will arise from 
participating in an experiment. The priors for both groups have zero mean. When 
a potential subject is given an opportunity to join a trial, she also receives a 
private signal about the personal benefit of participation. With the signal she 
updates her beliefs, and joins the trial if her posterior mean is positive. In the 
first scenario, the potential subject’s beliefs are formed efficiently (i.e. by 
Bayesian means), so that, whether or not she decides to join, her subjective mean 
is equal to the mathematical expectation conditional on the signal. However, 
researchers do not observe the private signal because they have only limited 
information about the subject, and so their belief remains unchanged from the 
prior.1 When researchers subsequently compare their expectation about the 
                                         
1 Subjects may have found that existing treatments have not worked for them, or that 
they had unusually severe side effects. Chard and Lilford [1998] point out that most 
treatments involve a vector of characteristics and how these are weighted depends on 
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personal benefit with the expectations of their subjects, they conclude that every 
single subject suffers from the therapeutic misconception. In reality, no one does. 
 In the second scenario, potential subjects are not efficiently Bayesian. The 
key assumption we make is that individuals are overconfident about the accuracy 
of signals they receive, in the sense that they believe noisy signals indicating the 
benefit from participation to be more accurate than they really are.2 In this 
scenario, subjects revise their beliefs too much in response to the signal. Although 
the average subjective posterior mean of all individuals is unbiased, self-selection 
into trials by individuals that received a positive signal implies that every 
subjects’ posterior means exceeds the true conditional expectation. Researchers, 
whether they observe the signal or not, will again conclude that subjects suffer 
from the therapeutic misconception. In this case they are correct.  
 The second scenario is clearly of more concern. When individuals are 
overconfident they are not capable of providing informed consent, even though 
they make use of all information available to them. Absent conscious intervention  
to tackle the problem, the therapeutic bias vanishes only at the extremes when 
subjects are either completely uninformed or perfectly informed. The former 
                                                                                                             
patient preferences.  
2 There is an extensive and convincing psychological literature supporting the assumption 
of overconfidence about the accuracy of private information. It has been found in 
numerous experimental settings (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips [1982], Yates 
[1990]), and in many professional fields (see Odean [1998] and Barber and Odean [2001] 
for extensive references). The idea has since been fruitfully applied to applications in 
finance (De Long et al. [1991], Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam [1998], Kyle and 
Wang [1997], Odean [1998], entrepreneurship (Klepper and Thompson [2005]), and 
auction theory (Compte [2004]). 
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extreme hardly seems a desirable way to eliminate the therapeutic bias; the latter 
hardly seems feasible. 
 It is important to distinguish between the therapeutic misconception and the 
better-known concept of the winner’s curse. We have interpreted the therapeutic 
misconception as being a state in which a subject’s expectation exceeds the 
mathematical expectation. The winner’s curse, which we will call 
“disappointment” here to distinguish it from settings in auction theory, exists 
when a subject’s expectation exceeds the realized benefit of participation. We will 
show that selection alone induces disappointment on average. However, 
overconfidence exacerbates the problem.3 
 Section II of the paper formalizes these ideas. We then show that in many 
settings a simple solution is to offer a significant monetary payment for 
participation. This finding is incompatible with the widespread practice of 
offering only token compensation, apparently because of concerns that sizeable 
payments might be “coercive”, or might undermine altruistic motivations to 
participate. However, we are not the first to propose large payments to tackle the 
therapeutic misconception. Dickert and Grady [1999] have argued that payments 
would serve to “remind” subjects that participation provides service to others 
rather than to the subject. While our case for payments is different, it 
complements their proposal. 
B. Self-Selection by Researchers and Clinical Equipoise            
 The prevailing view among ethicists is that clinical trials should be 
                                         
3 Compte [2004] has employed a similar idea to generate the winner’s curse from private 
value Vickrey auctions. 
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conducted only under conditions of equipoise. Individual equipoise exists when a 
rational informed person has no preference between two treatments, say an 
established treatment and an experimental treatment. Collective equipoise exists 
when the profession as a whole has no clear preference for one treatment over 
another. Under collective equipoise, individuals may have distinct preferences but 
differing preferences approximately cancel each other out (Johnson, Lilford, and 
Brazier [1991], Gifford [1995]). The notion of equipoise underlies the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki, which prohibits the use of placebos when an effective 
treatment already exists, and it is a central concern of ethics committees 
(Kennedy [1991]).  
 A case has been made that trials should be conducted only in situations of 
“collective equipoise” (Freedman [1987]). It has also been argued that the Golden 
rule demands that individual equipoise holds for each physician suggesting 
research participation to his or her own patients (Chard and Lilford [1998]). 
Thus, both collective and individual equipoise have been indicated as essential for 
the ethical conduct of clinical trials. 
 Selection by researchers into trials undermines obtaining both collective and 
individual equipoise. Collective equipoise is based on public information, most 
notably the information revealed from the publication of the results of 
randomized trials. But individuals conducting these trials invariably have private 
information based on their specialized efforts in preliminary experimentation, and 
their ongoing research into the physiology or biochemistry of possible 
treatments.4 If ethical researchers select themselves into conducting promising 
                                         
4 The claim that researchers have prior information is well-understood. For example 
Lilford [2003, p. 980] writes that “[s]ome evidence always exists before a randomized 
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experiments, and they are better informed than the collective consciousness, then 
it must be the case that collective equipoise is consistent with a positive expected 
benefit of a new treatment. 
 Section III analyses the causes and consequences of selection by researchers. 
We assume that a researcher is faced with a sequence of research opportunities, 
but resource constraints prevent her from pursuing all of them. Collective 
equipoise requires that the benefit of innovative treatments (relative to a placebo 
or existing treatment, as appropriate) embodied in each of these opportunities 
has prior mean zero.5 Accompanying each opportunity, the researcher receives a 
private signal about the expected benefit. In this setting, the researcher only 
initiates projects for which her posterior mean is strictly positive. That is, if there 
is collective equipoise, there cannot be individual equipoise. To restore individual 
equipoise, ethics committees must be willing to approve trials on innovative 
treatments for which the (collective) prior mean is negative. 
 We also explore one important implication of selection. If collective equipoise 
is maintained as an ethical criterion, selection by better-informed researchers into 
experiments on treatments for which there is collective equipoise undermines the 
                                                                                                             
clinical trial is done: in vitro and animal experiments, the same treatment in other 
diseases, similar treatments in the same disease, and perhaps even randomized clinical 
trials done elsewhere. Thus clinicians have some idea of what treatments might 
accomplish, even in advance of a trial.” The consequences of this prior information for 
selection does not appear to be so well understood. 
5 This is an excessively precise interpretation of collective equipoise convenient for 
modeling. It ignores what Chard and Lilford [1998, p.898)] have called the “fuzzy 
boundary of appreciation of numeric concepts inherent in human behavior.” 
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case for experimental designs that maximize statistical power. Instead, 
experimental designs should reflect prior information held by researchers, trading 
statistical power against the expected net benefits for subject participants. How 
we should go about doing this depends critically on how we choose to weight the 
short-term benefits for participants against possible future benefits for society. 
We do not attempt to resolve that issue in this paper, which is outside the scope 
of formal economic analysis. However we do explore the factors that affect 
optimal experimental design conditional on any given set of weights.  
II. Self-Selection by Subjects 
 When an individual is faced with an opportunity to participate in a trial, it 
comes accompanied by a signal, ζ, which is positively correlated with the private 
benefit of participation. If she chooses to participate in the trial she receives a 
benefit b. The benefit has unconditional distribution F(b), with zero expectation 
and domain ,b b    . Clearly, for a non-degenerate distribution we must have 
0b <  and 0b > . The individual’s subjective belief about b after observing the 
signal is given by the conditional distribution, ( | )F b ζ , which is decreasing in ζ 
for all b. Hence, [ | ]E b ζ  is increasing in ζ. The subjective posterior distribution 
and mean may differ from the Bayesian posteriors, which we denote by *( | )F b ζ  
and *[ | ]E b ζ . 
 The individual will choose to participate in the trial if she received a signal 
such that [ ]| 0E b ζ ≥ . If ζˆ  denotes the signal that satisfies ˆ| 0E b ζ  =   , all 
subjects must have received signals, ˆζ ζ≥ .  Let G(ζ) denote the distribution of 
the signal, and let *( | )G bζ  denote the (correct) conditional distribution.6 Then 
                                         
6 Letting lower case letters denote the corresponding densities, Bayes’ rule gives 
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the average belief of all individuals with true benefit b, is  
 [ ] *| ( | )E b dG bζ ζ
∞
−∞
∫ , (1) 
while the average belief of all subjects with true benefit b is 
 [ ] **
ˆ
1 | ( | )ˆ1 ( | )
E b dG b
G b ζ
ζ ζζ
∞
− ∫ . (2) 
Building on Compte [2004], we make the following assumptions: 
 A.1 *[ | ]E b bζ = , 
 A.2 *[ | ] ( ) [ | ]E b E bζ λ ζ ζ= , 
 A.3 ( ) 1 0λ ζ ζ≥ ∀ ≠ ; ( ) ( )λ ζ λ ζ= − . 
 Assumption A.1 says that the signal is unbiased. Assumption A.2 states that 
the (possibly erroneous) subjective posterior mean can be expressed as a 
proportion of the correct mathematical expectations, where the factor of 
proportionality may depend on the observable ζ but not on the unobservable b. 
Assumption A.3 states that deviations of the signal from the prior in either 
direction induce the same degree of bias between the subjective and objective 
conditional means, which ensures we do not introduce therapeutic misconception 
by construction. If individuals are Bayesian, then ( ) 1λ ζ ζ= ∀ . If individuals are 
overconfident, then ( ) 1 0λ ζ ζ> ∀ ≠ . Given these assumptions, ˆ 0ζ = . 
A. The Therapeutic Misconception 
 It is now easy to evaluate the extent of apparent or real therapeutic 
                                                                                                             
* *( | ) ( | ) ( )/ ( )g b f b g f bζ ζ ζ= . 
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misconception under the two scenarios introduced in Section IA. Consider first 
the scenario in which individuals are Bayesian, but their signal is not observed by 
the researcher.7 Then the researcher believes [ ] 0E b = , while the average 
posterior mean of subjects is 
 [ ]* **
0
1 | ( | ) 0
1 (0 | )
E b dG b
G b
ζ ζ
∞
>− ∫ . (3) 
Thus, the researcher concludes there is therapeutic misconception. However, (3) 
is the correct conditional expectation, so the appearance of therapeutic 
misconception is spurious. Concerns about the therapeutic misconception arise in 
this case only because outside observers fail to acknowledge that subjects self-
select. 
 In the second scenario, with overconfident individuals, average therapeutic 
misconception for any given b is given by 
 [ ] [ ]* **
0
1( ) | | ( | )
1 (0 | )
b E b E b dG b
G b
µ ζ ζ ζ
∞
= −− ∫  
       ( ) [ ]* **
0
1 ( ) 1 | ( | )
1 (0 | )
E b dG b
G b
λ ζ ζ ζ
∞
= −− ∫  
       >0. (4) 
In this case, the apparent therapeutic misconception is real.  
 In general, the function ( )λ ζ  will depend on both the prior distribution of b 
and the distribution of the signal. To investigate how these distributions affect 
the severity of the therapeutic misconception, it is useful to turn to a specific 
                                        
7 We can readily extend the analysis to allow researchers to observe the signals with 
noise. The same implications follow, however. 
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example. Hence, assume that F(b) is normal with mean zero and variance 2bσ ,8 
and that bζ ε= + , where ( )20,N εε σ∼ . Then, given a signal, ζ, the conditional 
expectation is 
 
2
*
2 2[ | ]
b
b
E b
ε
σ ζζ σ σ= + . (5) 
We assume that the subjective posterior mean is given by 
 
2
2 1 2[ | ]
b
b
E b
ε
σ ζζ σ λ σ−= + , (6) 
for some constant λ>1. Conditional on b, ( )* 2( | ) ,G b N b εζ σ∼ , while the 
unconditional distribution of the signal is ( )2 2( ) 0, bG N εζ σ σ+∼ . Then, the 
average therapeutic misconception for all individuals with true benefit b and 
entry threshold ζˆ  is 
 
( )( )( )
2 2
*
* 2 2 2 2
ˆ
( 1)( ) ( | ) 0
ˆ1 ( | )
b
b b
b dG b
G b
ε
ε ε ζ
λ σ σµ ζ ζζ λσ σ σ σ
∞−= >− + + ∫ , (7) 
while the average therapeutic misconception over all subjects is  
 
( )( )( )
2 2
2 2 2 2
ˆ
( 1)( ) ( ) ( ) 0
ˆ1 ( )
b
b b
b dF b dG
G
ε
ε ε ζ
λ σ σµ µ ζ ζζ λσ σ σ σ
∞ ∞
−∞
−≡ = >− + +∫ ∫ . (8) 
In this setting, the correct threshold is again ˆ 0ζ = , but it is useful not to impose 
this for now so we can assess the effect of ζˆ  on the size of the therapeutic 
misconception.9  
                                        
8 That is, the interval [ ] ( ), ,b b → −∞ ∞ . 
9 For example, if there is a cost, c, (in time, travel, discomfort, etc.) of participating, then 
ˆ (ˆ )cζ ζ=  is increasing in c.  
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 It is straightforward to assess the effects of parameter changes by evaluating 
(7) and (8). Figure 1 summarizes the effects with representative plots. The 
function µ(b) is monotonically increasing, and therapeutic misconception exists 
for all values of b. Somewhat surprisingly, then, the greater the true benefit for 
any given individual, the greater the therapeutic misconception. This arises 
because the term [ ]* |E b ζ  is stochastically increasing in b, so that 
[ ]*( ( ) 1) |E bλ ζ ζ−  is also stochastically increasing. Across all subjects, µ rises 
monotonically with ζˆ , reflecting the role of selection in creating the therapeutic 
misconception. Given that a personal cost, c, of participation raises ζˆ , the 
FIGURE 1. Comparative statics of average therapeutic misconception 
among subjects. 
b
µ(b)
µ
ζˆ0 0
µ
µ
µ
1 λ2bσ2εσ 00
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therapeutic misconception is greater in trials that impose a greater personal 
burden on the subject. The function µ also rises monotonically with λ, but it is 
has an upper bound given by 
1 1 12 2 22 2 2lim 2 ( )bλ ε εµ σ σ σ π− −→∞ = + . Hence, the effect 
of overconfidence is bounded. As confidence rises, so does the therapeutic 
misconception, but only until it attains the limit when subjects disregard the 
prior.  
 Finally, µ initially rises and then falls with increases in 2bσ  and 2εσ ; the 
numerical plots indicate that average therapeutic misconception is at its worst for 
modest values of 2bσ  and 2εσ , in both cases declining asymptotically to zero at a 
very slow rate. When signals are accurate, (i.e. 2 0εσ → ), it is not possible to 
overweight the signal relative to the prior, for the simple reason that the correct 
posterior mean is equal to the signal. At the other end of the spectrum, when 
signals are uninformative (i.e. 2εσ → ∞ ) the signal noise dominates 
overconfidence.10 Similarly, when there is no prior uncertainty about the benefit 
(i.e. 2 0bσ → ), there is no misconception. In this case, of course, a trial would be 
worthless. At the other extreme, as 2bσ → ∞ , the therapeutic misconception 
vanishes, again because the correct posterior mean equals the signal. 
B. Disappointment 
 The therapeutic misconception is concerned with subjects having excessively 
optimistic beliefs about the benefit of participating in a trial. Disappointment 
exists when [ | ]E b bζ > . Selection alone is enough to induce disappointment 
                                        
10 An alternative formulation of overconfidence has individuals believing the signal noise 
to be 2ˆεσ , while the true noise is 2 2ˆε εσ σ+ . In this case, the therapeutic misconception 
monotonically increases with 2εσ .  
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among subjects, because individuals that face the prospect of good outcomes but 
receive misleadingly bad signals choose not to become subjects. If individuals are 
Bayesian, the fact that Bayesian updating is unbiased implies 
 [ ]* *| ( | ) ( ) 0E b dG b b dF bζ ζ
∞
−∞
  − =   ∫∫ , (9) 
so that with selection, 
 [ ]* **
ˆ
1 | ( | ) ( ) 0ˆ1 ( | )
E b dG b b dF b
G b ζ
ζ ζζ
∞  − > −  
∫∫ . (10) 
 However, an important consequence of overconfidence is that it increases the 
likelihood that subjects will be disappointed ex post. Figure 2 plots for each b the 
expected difference between posterior beliefs and the true benefit for the Bayesian 
case (λ=1) and for the case in which there is overconfidence (λ>1). In both 
cases, the difference is declining, but at a greater rate for the Bayesian case. In 
each case, there exists a b*(λ)>1, strictly increasing in λ, such that for any 
realized benefit less than b*, subjects will on average turn out to be disappointed.  
 Factors affecting selection and the revision of posterior beliefs will in turn 
affect the average degree of disappointment. As in the previous subsection, we 
can calculate for the normal case that disappointment will be more widespread 
and profound in trials with more overconfident subjects, that impose greater 
personal costs on subjects, and that have intermediate values of 2bσ  and 2εσ . 
C. Attenuating Therapeutic Misconception and Disappointment 
 There are several ways in which therapeutic misconception and 
disappointment can be attenuated or, in some cases, eliminated. First, subjects 
could be kept completely uninformed. Doing so equates the prior and posterior 
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beliefs and eliminates selection, and in this case there is on average no 
misconception and no disappointment among subjects. Second, subjects could be 
kept perfectly informed. In this case, [ ]|E b bζ ≡ , so there is neither therapeutic 
misconception nor disappointment. Third, it may be possible to educate potential 
subjects so that overoptimism is reduced. Doing so will attenuate both 
misconception and disappointment. However, even if all overoptimism was 
eliminated, disappointment would continue to plague the average subject because 
of selection. 
 A fourth alternative is to pay imperfectly informed subjects. Payment will 
attenuate both the therapeutic misconception and disappointment because it 
reduces selection. Let w denote the payment made to subjects, and let b continue 
to denote the medical benefits accruing to participation. Then an individual will 
b0
Ex post disappointment
Therapeutic misconception
[ ]* | ;E E b bζ λ  − 
λ=1
λ>1
b*(λ)b*(1)
FIGURE 2. Plots of *
0
[ | ] ( | )E b dG b bζ ζ∞ −∫  
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choose to become a subject if she receives a signal (ˆ )wζ ζ> , where 
ˆ| ( )E b w wζ  = −   . Clearly, (ˆ )wζ  is monotonically decreasing in w. Hence, the 
higher the payment the less misconception and disappointment there will be. 
 If the support of the prior distribution, F(b), has finite lower bound, b <0, 
then there exists a payment, ( )w b , increasing in b , that eliminates selection 
entirely. If b →−∞ , no finite payment can eliminate selection. Nonetheless, 
selection – and hence the therapeutic misconception and disappointment – can be 
reduced. To attain any target level of misconception or disappointment, the 
indicated payment is greater for intermediate values of 2bσ  and 2εσ , and it is 
increasing in λ and c. 
IV. Self-selection by Researchers 
 Just as people do not become subjects at random, neither do researchers 
select the trials they conduct at random. Clinical researchers behave just as do 
researchers in other fields by pursuing opportunities that look most promising to 
them. With the great degree of specialization in research, it is perhaps inevitable 
that researchers in any particular area have considerably more information about 
promising avenues than does the profession as a whole. In this section, we show 
that in the presence of selection by researchers, collective equipoise in the 
profession as a whole is very likely to preclude collective equipoise among 
researchers as a group. To illustrate how selection of researchers can matter, we 
then show how this undermining of collective equipoise in turn undermines the 
rationale for designing trials to maximize statistical power. 
A.  Selection and Equipoise 
 Consider a randomized trial intended to compare an innovative treatment 
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with either an existing treatment or a placebo. The outcome for patient i 
receiving treatment j is given by ij j iq µ ε= + , where the innovative treatment, 
j=1 is compared against the alternative j=0, and ( )20,i Nε σ∼ . Assume that µ0 
is known, and let 1 0µ µ µ= − . Collective equipoise implies that the unconditional 
distribution, F(µ) has mean zero. However, when the opportunity to conduct the 
trial is presented to a researcher it is accompanied by a signal, ,ζ ζ ζ ∈    , that is 
as usual positively correlated with µ. The researcher has beliefs about µ given by 
the conditional distribution ( | )F µ ζ . Her payoff from conducting the trial is zero 
if the new treatment turns out to be no better than the existing treatment or a 
placebo (i.e. if 0µ ≤ ), and by the increasing, concave utility function, u(µ), 
u(0)=0, otherwise.  
 A researcher facing a static choice about whether to conduct this trial will 
choose to do so regardless of the signal. In that case, there is no selection and the 
expected value of all trials is consistent with collective equipoise. But researchers 
do not select projects in a static setting. Conducting one trial precludes, or 
postpones, the pursuit of other perhaps more exciting opportunities. And in this 
dynamic setting, the choice a researcher makes about any one trial does depend 
on the signal she receives. 
 Consider the following stylized setting. A researcher can only conduct one 
trial, but an opportunity is presented each period with probability φ. If the 
researcher chooses to not to pursue the current opportunity, then next period she 
must wait again with probability 1 φ− , while with probability φ she receives 
another opportunity with signal /ζ . This is a classic optimal stopping problem. 
Let θ denote the discount factor. The value of being presented with an 
opportunity with signal ζ is 
 18
 { }/( ) max [ ( ) | ], [ ( )] (1 )V E u EVζ µ ζ θ φ ζ φ ν = + −   , (11)   
where 
 /[ ( )] (1 )EVν θ φ ζ φ ν = + −    (12) 
is the value of not being presented with an opportunity. If the researcher chooses 
to pursue the current opportunity, she receives an expected benefit of [ ( ) | ]E u µ ζ . 
Solving (12) for ν and substituting into (11) yields 
 
/[ ( )]
( ) max [ ( ) | ],
1 (1 )
EV
V E u
θφ ζζ µ ζ θ φ
   =   − −  
. (13) 
There is a unique signal, ζˆ , such that the researcher chooses not to conduct the 
trial if and only if ˆζ ζ< . Assuming { }/,ζ ζ  are independent, 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) [ ( ) | ]V V E uζ ζ µ ζ= =  for all ˆζ ζ≤ . If ˆζ ζ> , the researcher pursues the 
current opportunity and ( ) [ ( ) | ]V E uζ µ ζ= . Hence, ζˆ  satisfies 
 [ ]
ˆ
*
ˆ ˆ( ) | ( ) | ( ) ( ) | ( )
1 (1 )
E u E u dG E u dG
ζ
ζ
θφµ ζ µ ζ ζ µ ζ ζθ φ
∞
−∞
      +       − −   
≥ ∫ ∫ . (14) 
A simple rearrangement yields the fundamental reservation equation for the 
expected utility of conducting a trial: 
 [ ]( )
ˆ
ˆ ˆ( ) | ( ) | ( ) | ( )
1
E u E u E u dG
ζ
θφµ ζ µ ζ µ ζ ζθ
∞   −      −≥ ∫ . (15) 
 Equation (15) allows a corner solution, when (15) is satisfied for ζˆ ζ= . This 
possibility is more likely when the signal is known to be noisy (so prior beliefs are 
not revised too drastically) or when θ or φ is small (so the option value of waiting 
is limited). In this case, there is no selection, and collective equipoise holds 
simultaneously for researchers and for the profession as a whole. In many cases, 
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however, we can expect an interior solution, ζˆ ζ> , for which (15) is an equality. 
As the left hand side of (15) is increasing in ζˆ  while the right hand side is 
decreasing in ζˆ , the interior solution is unique. In this case, researchers are not 
in collective equipoise as selection implies that 
 [ ] [ ] [ ]
ˆ
1 | ( ) | ( ) 0ˆ1 ( )
E dG E dG E
G
ζ ζ
ζζ
µ ζ ζ µ ζ ζ µζ > = =− ∫ ∫ . (16) 
The required expected utility to justify conducting the trial is increasing in θ and 
φ, and hence so is ζˆ . Hence the deviation from collective equipoise among 
researchers is increasing in the rate at which new opportunities for participation 
arrive and in the discount factor.  
 To extend the analysis further, assume now that researchers can consider 
new opportunities after the current trial is completed. Assume that that a trial 
lasts n>1 periods, where n is an i.i.d. draw. The value function in this case is 
given by 
 { / /( , ) max [ ( ) | ] [ ( , )] (1 ) ,nV n E u EV nζ µ ζ θ φ ζ φ ν =   + + −  
                                                             }/ /[ ( , )] (1 )EV nθ φ ζ φ ν   + − . (17) 
Following the same steps as previously, the reservation equation satisfies 
 
( ) ( )/ /ˆ( ) | ( ) 1 ,
n
E u n EV n
φ
µ ζ θ
θ θ ζ  =   −
−
. (18) 
As { }/,n n  and { }/,ζ ζ are pairs of independent r.v.s and [0,1]θ ∈ , the right 
hand side of (18) is strictly increasing in n. Hence (ˆ )nζ  is strictly increasing in n, 
so that the deviation from collective equipoise is greater among researchers 
conducting long trials. 
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B. Selection and Statistical Power 
 Clinical researchers must balance diverse concerns in the conduct of trials. 
On the one hand, they should be concerned that the scientific value of the trial 
be as great as possible. On the other, they should be concerned with the welfare 
of subjects. Equipoise allows researchers to avoid a potential conflict between 
these concerns. The scientific value of research is enhanced by, inter alia, greater 
statistical power of an experimental design. Equipoise allows researchers to design 
a trial to maximize statistical power without facing a conflict with concern for 
the welfare of subjects. However, when researchers are not in equipoise, the 
conflict is not so readily avoided. Concern for the expected welfare of subjects 
leads the researcher to prefer that a greater fraction of subjects receive the 
treatment about which the researchers is optimistic. Unfortunately, doing so 
reduces statistical power. 
 To see this, consider again the clinical trial setting described in the previous 
subsection, and assume again that the unconditional distribution, F(µ) has mean 
zero. Selection now implies that, while researcher beliefs are ( | )F µ ζ , the domain 
is reduced to ,ˆζ ζ ζ ∈    , and [ ] 0E µ >  for each researcher. Finally, although the 
researcher has beliefs governed by Bayesian thinking, she follows norms in the 
profession and compares means with classical statistics.  
 Let n denote the sample size and let ρ denote the fraction of the sample 
assigned to the innovative treatment. The power, β, of a t-test for a difference in 
means with size five percent, as measured by the z score, is 
 1
(1 )
1.96
n
z β
ρ ρ µ
σ−
−
= − + . (19) 
which, regardless of beliefs about µ,  is maximized by dividing subjects evenly 
 21
between the two treatments. However, the researcher is concerned with balancing 
the expected power of the test against the expected benefit to participants, and 
so faces the objective function  
  
(1 )
max (1 ) ( | ) ( | )
n
dF dF
ρ
ρ ρα µ µ ζ αρ µ µ ζσ
∞ ∞
−∞ −∞
  − − +     ∫ ∫ . (20) 
The solution, ρ*, satisfies 
 
*
* *
( | )(1 2 )
(1 ) ( | )2 (1 )
dF
n dF
µ µ ζρ ασ
α µ µ ζρ ρ
−− = −−
∫
∫ . (21) 
The left (L) and right (R) hand sides of (21) are plotted in Figure 3. If there is  
no signal, then [ ] 0E µ =  and ρ*=0.5. However, given a signal sufficiently 
promising to induce the researcher to conduct the trial in the first place, the right 
hand side is strictly positive, so that ρ*>0.5. Perhaps surprisingly, increases in σ 
and reductions in n shift R up and induce the researcher to increase the fraction 
of subjects, ρ*, receiving the innovative treatment. When there is little variation 
in outcomes across individuals or the sample size is larger, researchers get more 
“bang for their buck” in terms of increased power upon keeping ρ close to 0.5. 
Finally, a mean preserving spread in the researcher’s posterior distribution raises 
( | )dFµ µ ζ∫ , shifts R downwards, and therefore reduces ρ*. Thus, if two 
researchers have the same posterior mean for µ, then the researcher with the 
greater confidence in this expectation will choose to raise the fraction of subjects 
receiving the innovative treatment by the greater amount.  
V. Conclusions  
 Selection by participants into clinical trials may lead to ex ante therapeutic 
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misconception and ex post disappointment on the part of subjects. Selection by 
researchers into clinical trials is incompatible with maintaining collective and 
individual equipoise, and implies that balanced randomization is unethical. In 
this paper, we explore both of these situations, and propose solutions for both. 
 For research participants, disappointment and therapeutic misconception 
may always exist, and may be exacerbated by individual characteristics. We find 
that when individuals are overconfident in the signals that they receive 
concerning the benefits of trial participation, therapeutic misconception and 
disappointment are increased. Unfortunately, little empirical evidence exists as to 
which other individual characteristics affect the therapeutic misconception. Lidz 
and Appelbaum [2002] review the literature, and report that some studies have 
linked age and education to understanding of trial procedures, and illness severity 
with attributing therapeutic goals to non-therapeutic research. However, no 
studies appear to directly measure a relationship between individual 
ρ
R
L
1ρ∗0.50
FIGURE 3. Solution to (21) 
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characteristics and either misconception or disappointment. 
 When the therapeutic misconception and/or disappointment are induced in 
trial participants, the trial – and research as a whole – may suffer. Individuals 
may drop out of trials if they become aware of their misconception, and may 
then hold, and spread, a distrust of clinical research. It is because of this, and the 
ethical requirement of respect for persons, that researchers and ethicists try to 
devise ways of reducing therapeutic misconception. Education and more extensive 
informed consent do not appear to work. Here, we propose a nontrivial payment 
as a means of ameliorating therapeutic misconception and disappointment. This 
is not an entirely new idea, as the National Institutes of Health Section on 
Human Subjects Research in 2002 proposed “evaluating the possibility of an 
inverse relationship between money for research participation and the therapeutic 
misconception.” (Grady et al. [2002]). Findings from this research may eventually 
yield data that supports our claims here. 
 Selection by researchers when deciding which trials to conduct may also have 
substantial ethical and practical implications for conducting clinical trials. If, as 
we argue, research select into trials due to private information, and collective 
equipoise is an important ethical criteria for conducting a trial, then maximizing 
statistical power with equal samples appears unethical. This as well is not a new 
idea. Acknowledging that individual equipoise is unlikely in most clinical trials, 
others have also argued that a unbalanced sample may be useful for enhancing 
the ethical design of human subjects research (Avins [1998], Edwards and 
Braunholtz [2000]). The specific weights that one should give to current benefits 
for participants and future benefits to society will be difficult to calculate, and 
may vary with a number of characteristics of a specific research project. Such a 
calculation is outside of the realm of formal economic analysis, but empirical 
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psychological and ethical research may reveal approximate figures.  
 Because of the long and continuing debates over both the therapeutic 
misconception and equipoise, formalization of these concepts, as we have done 
here, seems long overdue. The predictions generated by our model should inform 
future empirical research in this area. 
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